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Although historians of economic thought emphasize J.-B. Say’s contributions to utility 
theory, the structure of the subject matter of economics, entrepreneur theory and the 
construction of the “law of markets,” they rarely appreciate what Say accomplished in 
the first edition of the Traité d’Économie Politique. Only in chapters 21 and 22 of his 
1803 Treatise, however, does Say sketch business firms as institutions that create and 
operate markets. In doing so, he essentially provides the basis for a non-walrasian con-
cept of the coordination problem of a decentralized economic system. Thus, concerning 
Adam Smith’s metaphor of the “invisible hand,” Say ought to be considered as the first 
theorist to introduce into economic literature what Robert W. Clower called the “visible 
fingers” of the “invisible hand.” 
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Introduction 
On the occasion of the 200
th anniversary of the publication of Adam Smith’s classic, 
Roland H. Coase described The Wealth of Nations as a work that “still lives and from 
which we continue to learn” [1977, p. 309]. Although Say’s Traité d'Économie 
Politique
1 celebrates its 200
th anniversary this year, no similar claim of timelessness has 
thus far been established. In spite of sporadic attempts to correct his standing in the his-
tory of economic thought,
2 Say’s name would long have been forgotten were it not so 
tightly attached to the so-called “law of markets.” As Mark Blaug noted, “Jean-Baptiste 
Say is almost unread today” [1991, p. ix]. Valid for Say’s writings in general, Blaug’s 
judgment is all the more true for the first edition of the Traité. 
Despite its marginality in modern economic discourses, Say’s Traité deserves recogni-
tion as a basis for an alternative foundation for applied economics. My paper suggests 
that Say’s work outlines a way toward the advancement of economic science by por-
traying money and trading firms as the institutions coordinating the economic exchange 
process. The term “coordination of economic activities” thereby refers to an actual 
economy’s ability to balance the transactors’ desired sales and purchases or, in other 
words, to the economy‘s self-regulating capabilities.
3 The idea of the exchange econ-
omy as a self-regulating mechanism goes back, of course, to Adam Smith, and repre-
sents the gist of his famous “invisible hand”-metaphor.
4 In chapters 21 and 22 of his 
Traité, Say basically provides “a nontechnical portrait of the ‘fingers‘ that […] are re-
sponsible for the visible action of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’” [Clower, 1994, p. 3].
5 
                                                           
1 The full title is Traité d'Économie Politique ou Simple Exposition de la Manière dont se Forment, se 
Distribuent, et se Consomment les Richesse. Unless stated otherwise, references are to the original French 
edition, published in 1803 in Paris in two volumes (Tome I and II) with a total of more than one-thousand 
pages. Where the chapters of the original edition were not accessible to the author, the German translation 
of the Traité, published in 1807 in Halle and Leipzig, served as a primary text. All quotes from the 1807 
German edition of the Traité have been translated by the author. Direct quotes from the 1803 Traité, 
except noted otherwise, have been translated by Baumol [1977]. 
2 See, for example, Koolman’s [1971] re-assessment of Say’s contribution to the theory of the entrepre-
neur. Palmer’s [1997] biography also analyzes the contributions of the first edition of the Traité to eco-
nomic theory [pp. 1-5 and pp. 67-89]. 
3 For this definition see Axel Leijonhufvud [1973, p. 104-105]. 
4 Smith introduces and discusses the invisible hand in book IV, chapter ii of The Wealth of Nations 
[(1776) 1979, IV.ii.10, p. 456]. The economy’s „automatic“ adjustment mechanism, the „System of Natu-
ral Liberty,“ Smith discusses in his famous chapter vii “Of the Natural and Market Price of Commodities” 
[(1776) 1979, I.vii]. 
5 Clower [1994] named trade intermediaries the “visible fingers” of the “invisible hand,” because their 
activities lend order and coherence to the independent exchange decisions of millions of transactors and 
may thus be regarded as the real-world counterparts of Smith’s metaphor. In Germany, there are currently 
about 37 million households, more than 2 million enterprises and about 15.000 governmental institutions 
in exchange relations with one another. J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 2 – 
A re-reading of the Traité from the point of view of the coordination of economic ac-
tivities is not only instructive for an understanding of the working of a market economy. 
In addition, the inquiry reveals that one cannot ascertain any law-like proposition in the 
famous chapter “Des Débouchés,” the supposed origin of the law of markets. Further-
more, the proposed interpretation reveals that Say clearly recognized the importance of 
money for a highly subdivided exchange economy. 
Preliminary Note: The Smithian Diversion 
In her review of the discourse on Smith, Vivienne Brown [1997, p. 287] considers the 
Smithian market theory as a forerunner of neowalrasian
6 economics. Despite carrying a 
positive note for some economists,
7 this observation reveals an important shortcoming 
in Smithian as well as neowalrasian economics: regarding the coordination of economic 
activities, both abstract from money and markets and assume their functions to be per-
formed by a mythical entity.
8 Similar to Smith talking about individuals being led by an 
“invisible hand,” neowalrasians appeal to “the auctioneer” or to “the price system” in 
order to “explain” the adjustment process between supply and demand.
9 In particular 
neowalrasians deflect theoretical attention from market processes to an impersonal set 
of (production or consumption) choices and consider them to be costless and executed 
perfectly. 
Granted that Smith’s conceptual model
10 of the economic system is as defective as that 
of modern neowalrasians, his approach equals that of other inductive sciences. Smith 
                                                           
6 Following Clower [1995, p. 307, fn. 1], I regard the word „neowalrasian” as an impersonal noun that 
requires no capitalization as there exists only an inspirational connection between Walras’ Éléments and 
the writings of his followers (e.g., Hicks [1939], Samuelson [1947], Arrow and Debreu [1954], and De-
breu [1959]). For an analysis of the gulf separating Walras’ work from that of his disciples see Costa 
[1998b]. 
7 See, for example, the statement of Arrow and Hahn [1971, pp. vi-vii]. 
8 For an analysis of the futility of money and markets in an Arrow-Debreu-world see Starr [1972]. Starr 
[1972] is a duplicated form of chapter 1 of Starr’s Ph.D.-thesis written under the supervision of Arrow in 
the late 1960s [Clower, 1994, p. 807, fn. 3]. 
9 Costa [1998a] analyzed how this conception constrained our understanding of the exchange process and, 
consequently, impeded progress in our understanding of the relevant stylized facts of an ongoing market 
economy.
 According to Costa, exchange theory developed into a sterile exercise where the question of 
existence of equilibrium prices for purely notional trading plans has been confused with the different 
question of how exchange plans can actually be carried out. See Clower [1994, pp. 807-808] for a com-
parison of the stylized facts of real-world economic behavior with the conception of economic „reality“ 
implied by neowalrasian theory. Blaug [2003, p. 154] concludes that “[t]he best way not to learn how 
markets function and how a competitive economy actually works is to study general equilibrium theory.” 
10 Clower [1989, pp. 12-14] uses the term “conceptual experiments” to refer to a category of scientific 
stories that “provides the reader with enough information to figure out not only what the teller of the story 
is saying but also what he is talking about.” Walker [1997] demonstrates that many general equilibrium 
theorists fail to specify their models such that the “reader knows what they are talking about.”  J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 3 – 
understood economics as the “study [of] observed actions of individuals interacting in 
trading relationships, with a view to discerning patterns of group behaviour worth cata-
loguing, explaining, and communicating” [Clower, 1998, p. 401]. Hence, according to 
Smith, a theory is comparable to an “imaginary machine invented to connect together in 
the fancy those different movements and effects which are already in reality performed” 
[1980, HA, IV.19, p. 66]
11. The neowalrasians’ deductive approach, on the other hand, 
invented a world to inquire whether it was conceivable in this form [Arrow and Hahn, 
1971, p. vii]. In order to emphasize the hypothetical character and formal nature of their 
models, “science fiction” would be a more appropriate term to label these works. 
This is not the place, however, to elaborate the methodological foundations of either 
Smithian or conventional general equilibrium analysis.
12 The claim I wish to establish is 
that, in contrast to the neowalrasians, Smith attempted to create a model description of 
an ongoing exchange economy.
13 Nonetheless, Smith ignored the reflections of Richard 
Cantillon, Jacques Turgot and David Hume on the “entrepreneur market-maker as the 
essential coordinator of economic activity” [Clower, 1998, pp. 398-400; Koolman, 
1971, p. 283]. Consequently, his retreat to the “invisible hand” deserves the label The 
Smithian Diversion [Clower, 1998, p. 401]. And, as far as the understanding of market 
processes is concerned, Smith’s procedure should be “treated not as an ingenious mod-
eling expedient […], but rather as an explanatory evasion which opened a yawning gap 
in economic analysis that requires closing” [p. 401]. Describing the organization of ex-
change through trade specialists, Say was the first economist who attemted to remedy 
Smith’s misstep. 
Markets as Institutions 
Following the “Discours Préliminare,”
14 Say begins his treatise by distinguishing three 
types of industry: agricultural, industrial (manufacture), and commercial. Commercial 
                                                           
11 Refers to Smith’s History of Astronomy, section IV, paragraph 19, page 66. Though first published in 
1795, Smith wrote the essay long before the publication of The Wealth of Nations, in the year 1758 (see 
Skinner [1987, p. 3]). 
12 For such an inquiry, see, for example, Costa [1998b]. 
13 The effect of his „invisible hand“ metaphor upon the subsequent developments of the theory of ex-
change may thus be deemed „unintentional” [Clower, 1998]. 
14 The Discourse is an extensive introduction on the nature and history of Political Economy to which Say 
attached a particular importance. In a letter to C. R. Pinsep, Say criticized its omission in the first transla-
tion: “[...] As for your translation, Monsieur, it seems to me to have been made conscientiously with a 
sincere desire to propagate economic knowledge. But I would have wished you to include the Introduc-
tion with which the work begins and the Epitome with which it ends. I know not why you have supposed 
that a preamble setting forth the purpose of political economy, answering objections raised against it as a 
field of knowledge, showing its advantages to mankind, and giving a brief history of its progress, should 
be without interest for readers of a book on this subject. Professors using it as a text in Italy, Germany, 
… J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 4 – 
industry is the type on which this discussion focuses. Say describes it as “transferring 
goods from places where they are plentiful to places where the consumers are [i.e., 
where they are scarce]” [1807, I.i.1, p. 3]
15. Say adds that, “[w]ithout commercial indus-
try[,] this kind of connection [between producers and consumers] could never be estab-
lished” [1807, I.i.1, p. 4]. Here, Say characterizes the essential function of trade inter-
mediaries, which is to perform the necessary tasks to organize and to maintain a link or 
a channel through which spatially scattered buyers and sellers may trade. According to 
Say, the parties involved could not exploit the potential gains from exchange without 
the trade intermediary.
16 In a later edition of the Traité, Say characterizes commercial 
industry as placing “within our reach objects of want which would otherwise be beyond 
reach” [(1834) 1964, I.ii, p. 64]. In other words, the trade specialist concentrates on ac-
tivities that enable exchanges otherwise uneconomical to be performed. A possible rea-
son consists in the existence of a lump-sum component in the search and transaction 
costs that customers incur each time they trade.
17 The trade specialist helps to reduce 
these costs by engaging in what will hereafter be called market-making services, which 
include price formation, stockholding, and provision of information.
18 
Say does not treat market-making functions explicitly, but proceeds by way of example. 
He emphasizes, however, that providing market-making services is a resource-
consuming, productive activity identical with that of any other industry (agriculture or 
manufacture)
19 and, consequently, may be performed with more or less diligence.
20 Say 
was the first economic thinker to argue consistently that to produce, in economics, is to 
give utility to things [1807, I.i.6, pp. 21-22]. But how is utility to be measured? Accord-
ing to Say, the quantity of goods offered for one quantity of another good approximately 
measures the relative utility of the first good to an individual [p. 22].
21 Hence, the ex-
change value of a good provides a measure of the extent of production.
22 Since the ex-
                                                                                                                                                                              
Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Holland have not shared in your opinion” [Oevres diverses, 4, 430; from: 
Palmer, 1997, p. 125]. 
15 Refers to the German translation of the Traité [1807], volume I, book i, chapter 1, page 3. 
16 This also hints at the entrepreneurial and (search) cost reducing function of the trade intermediary. He 
specializes in discovering links (basically markets) to realize potential gains from exchange. 
17 See Alchian [1969] and Hirshleifer [1973]. 
18 These include information on price, quality, location, availibility of inventory or risk of stockouts, 
payment methods, quality of service, and so forth [see Costa, 1998a, appendix F]. 
19 Likewise, for example, Spulber [1999, p. 3]: „Just as producing goods and services consumes re-
sources, so does the establishment and operation of markets to allocate those goods and services. Compa-
nies incur costs in adjusting prices and communicating price information to buyers and sellers.“ 
20 See Koolman [1971] for a general account of the nature, functions, and qualities of Say’s entrepreneur. 
21 Here Say basically hints at Walras’ [1965, p. 87] equation of exchange: m×va=n×vb in which va is the 
value in exchange of one unit of (A) and vb is the value in exchange of one unit of (B). Thus, the price of 
one commodity in terms of the other (i.e., the ratio of the values in exchange) is equal to the inverse ratio 
of the quantities exchanged; that is, va/vb=n/m. 
22 Say also outlines the relative nature of exchange value and distinguishes it from a goods money price 
(i.e., its exchange value relative to the commodity called “money”) [1807, I.6, p. 23]. J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 5 – 
change value of goods clearly depends upon their spatial location, and since commerce 
facilitates the exchange of things from one place to another, Say concludes that com-
mercial activity is productive in the proper sense of the word [p. 25].
23 
In the ensuing chapter “Des differentes manières de faire le Commerce“ [1803, I.i.21, 
pp. 147-151]
24, Say restates the necessity of trade due to the spatial separation of pro-
spective buyers and sellers. Furthermore, Say lists various kinds of trade specialists and 
describes the market-making services they perform. The retail dealer, for example, pro-
vides a ready market
25 for prospective buyers: he buys his products from the wholesale 
dealer and offers them for sale in his shop (store) to the customers. (And though Say did 
not mention this explicitly, a retail offer for sale usually involves the posting of an ask-
ing price.) Because the trade specialist organizes exchange
26 prior to the final purchase, 
the customers are in a position to buy the goods offered in quantities as small as they 
desire [p. 148]. The broker, another example chosen by Say, lowers transaction and bar-
gaining costs by providing information about the value of the traded objects (e.g., real 
estates), thereby enabling prospective buyers and sellers to locate each other. 
Later in the chapter, Say adumbrates the market-equilibrating function of trade interme-
diaries.
27 Due to the nature of commerce, trade specialists have a strong incentive to 
continually explore the current bid and ask prices of other producers. Thereby, the trade 
specialist directs his trade channels
28 to those places and products that offer gains from 
exchange considered worth exploiting. Say concludes that competition among different 
trade specialists places a check on profits and ensures that gains from exchange are re-
duced to their average (normal) level [p. 150]. 
According to Say, profit-seeking business firms organize and operate markets for other 
(non-specialist) transactors and thereby effectively coordinate the economic exchange 
process.
29 Consequently, Clower [1994, p. 13] demands that “we must focus [on the 
activities of trade specialists] if we are to have any hope of one day understanding the 
                                                           
23 Say wrongly assumes, however, that the exchange as such is not a productive activity (Say [1803, 
I.i.22, p. 147, fn. 1]; Gide and Rist [1913, p. 122, fn. 3]; Heyne [2000, pp. 134-135]). It should be noted, 
furthermore, that Say puts too much stress on the organization of exchange to the neglect of the produc-
tion of information by trade specialists [Heyne, 2000, p. 160]. In any case, regarding the utility of trade 
specialists, public consciousness seems to change very slowly. Note that almost two-hundred years after 
Say, Heyne [2000, p. 134] still talks about the „public’s deep-rooted suspicion of middlemen.“  
24 Refers to the French edition of the Traité [1803], volume I, book i, chapter 21, pages 147 to 151. 
25 See Friedman [1989]. 
26 These include the purchase of the goods at the wholesale dealer, transport to the retail dealer’s location, 
and the arrangements at the retailer’s shop. 
27 I have been unable to locate a similar passage in the second American Edition [Say, (1834) 1964]. 
28 Literally, Say wrote about the merchant’s industry and capital. 
29 See Clower [1994, pp. 9-12] for a verbal account of the price and quantity adjustments of a representa-
tive shop-owner. J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 6 – 
[actual] economic organism.”
30 And although we are able to conceive a world without 
organized exchange,
31 the importance of market-making firms for the economic well-
being of every actual member of society cannot be questioned. In the absence of organ-
ized trading facilities, a great deal of society’s resources would have to be used to per-
form costly search and transaction activities.
32 
Contrary to Say, Smith uses the term “market” vaguely by referring to the general inter-
dependence of its participants and its capacity for self-regulation (e.g., the invisible 
hand): 
The town is a continual fair or market, to which the inhabitants of the country resort, in order to 
exchange their rude for manufactured produce. It is this commerce which supplied the inhabi-
tants of the town both with the materials for their work, and the means of their subsistence. The 
quantity of the finished work which they sell to the inhabitants of the country, necessarily regu-
lates the quantity of the materials and provisions which they buy [(1776) 1979, III.i.4, p. 378]
33. 
As a result, one can not ascertain, for example, the meaning of Smith’s hypothesis set 
forth in the chapter “That the Division of Labour is limited by the Extent of the Mar-
ket”:
34 Arrow [1980, p. 155] interprets Smith as follows: 
[T]he more the selling of goods and services takes place, the greater can be the division of la-
bour [...] The subdivision of labour can be made finer and finer as the market extends. There is a 
mutually reinforcing relationship between specialization, and therefore greater efficiency, on the 
one hand and the growth of the market economy in which people are buying and selling on the 
other. The resulting differentiation in tasks performed gives rise to the profitability of trade; 
because people are doing different things, they can gain by exchanging these services in effect. 
Like Smith, however, Arrow remains unclear about the term “growth of the market 
economy.” Referring to “the extent of the market” in Smith, Starr [1972, p. 7] argues 
                                                           
30 Economists increasingly use models of organized exchange to explore topics in monetary theory, mar-
ket theory, and the theory of the firm. Howitt [2002] provides a model of endogenous fiat money in which 
specialist traders organize the exchange process through facilities called “shops.” Howitt and Clower 
[2000] use evolutionary game theory to show how a coordinating network of trade specialists emerges 
spontaneously in an economy where transactors follow simple adaptive rules. Spulber [1999] presents a 
microeconomic theory of the firm where firms are perceived as exchange intermediaries that establish and 
operate markets. Clower and Howitt [1996, 1997] consider market-making to be the principal function of 
business firms in a market economy. For further literature on the view that trading specialists coordinate 
the economy’s exchange process see the references in Howitt and Clower [2000, p. 56, fn. 1]. 
31 Modern search theory builds upon such a conception of economic activity. On the other extreme, gen-
eral equilibrium models assume that one general market costlessly and perfectly organizes exchange 
activities. 
32 In order to illustrate the importance of trade specialists, Clower [1994, pp. 534-535] conducted the 
following conceptual experiment: „[imagine] how life would be if one morning we awoke to discover (as 
have many Eastern Europeans in recent years) that all shops from which we normally buy and all em-
ployers for whom we normally work had simply vanished. No doubt most retail outlets would be replaced 
by new ones in a few months or a few years [...], and life might then go on much as before. In the interim, 
we should have to devote vast amounts of time and resources to arranging barter deals with other house-
holds, and many of us would probably expire in the process.“ 
33 Refers to The Wealth of Nations, book III, chapter i, paragraph 4. 
34 See Starr [1972, p. 7]. J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 7 – 
that “[t]he measure of the extent of an agent’s power of exchanging is the ease or diffi-
culty of performing exchange.“ In accordance with Say, trade channels organized by the 
network of trade specialists essentially determine the further development
35 of society 
by rendering the performance of exchanges for non-specialists more or less routine. 
Interpreting “Des Débouchés” 
Literally translated, “des débouches” means “outlets” or “markets.“ In defense of Say’s 
views on the organization of exchange, the term “des débouches” will henceforth be 
used to denote “an organized set of institutional arrangements for the negotiation [and 
execution] of exchange contracts among individual transactors” [italics removed; 
Clower and Due, 1972, p. 37]. Historians of economic thought single out the chapter 
“Des Débouchés,” because the “law of markets”
36 supposedly originates from this three-
page chapter in Say’s Traité  [1803, I.i.22, pp.153-155].
37 Since its re-statement by 
Lange [1942], however, the “law” and its content have been subject to intense exegeti-
cal efforts, comparable only to the profession’s attempt to scrutinize the meaning of the 
“invisible hand.”
38 Despite or because of their vague meanings, both concepts are con-
sidered to be equally “fundamental,” “essential,” “indispensable,” “vital,” “important” 
for a proper understanding of economic theory and, ultimately, the economic system.
39 
In the recent past, Kates [1998, 2003] examined the early developments of the law of 
markets, arguing that “Des Débouchés” “is a chapter devoted to explaining how each 
person’s own productions create a market for the goods produced by others” [italics 
mine, 1998, p. 22].
40 A re-reading of Say [1803] shows, however, that Kates’ conclusion 
is much closer to James Mill [1807] than to anything in “Des Débouchés.” In Com-
merce Defended, Mill argues that “[t]he production of commodities creates […] a mar-
                                                           
35 Leijonhuvfud [2000, p. 256] distinguishes development from growth: „Economic development, as 
opposed to ‚mere’ economic growth, is a process of system evolution toward more and more complex 
patterns of coordinated activities. It entails, in Adam Smith’s language, ‚increasing division of labour’.“ 
36 Because of its institutional character, Niehans [1994, p. 111] suggested that Say’s “law of markets” be 
renamed in “law of outlets.” 
37 Kates [1998, p. 21, fn. 4] and Thweatt [1987, p. 211] provide references to the origin debate. The dis-
cussion is about whether Mill [1807] or Say [1803] deserves credit for being the “discoverer” of the law 
of markets. This paper does not address this issue explicitly, but demonstrates that no “law-like” proposi-
tion can be ascertained in “Des Débouchés.” 
38 See Grampp [2000] for a survey of the literature on the concept of the invisible hand. 
39 Kates (ed.) [2003] calls Say’s Law „economic theory’s most controversial principle.“ Hutt [1963, p. 
389; from: Johnson, 2001] considers Say’s Law as “the basic economic reality in the light of which all 
economic thinking is illuminated.” Whether or not the debates will produce greater clarity, time will de-
cide. 
40 Note that, here, the term „market“ is used, as Baumol [1977, p. 147] explains, not as a trade-facilitating 
institution, but to denote the availability of effective demand. J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 8 – 
ket for the commodities produced” [italics mine, 1807, p. 81]. No sooner than in book iv 
of the second volume of the Traité [1803, II.iv.5, p. 175] may a similar proposition be 
found: “Is the quantity of outputs demanded consequently determined by the quantity of 
products created? Without any doubt.” In his review of Say’s Traité, Mill [1805, p. 419] 
describes this proposition as an “important relation between consumption and produc-
tion.”
41 Hence, Mill [1805] and later economists such as Kates [1998, 2003] ultimately 
ignored the contents of “Des Débouchés” and commented upon some of its purported 
implications discussed by Say in volume II (book iv) of the original Traité. 
In order to ascertain the original meaning of “Des Débouchés,” one first has to take a 
look at chapters ii (“Of the Principle which gives occasion to the Division of Labour”) 
and iii (“That the Division of Labour is limited by the Extent of the Market”) in Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations [(1776) 1976].
42 Here Smith reflects upon the mutual interdependence 
of individuals in a society organized by exchange, resulting from the social division of 
labor
43: 
Among men […] the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces 
of their respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being 
brought […] into a common stock [I.ii.5, p. 30]. 
When the market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself en-
tirely to one employment, for want of the power to exchange all that surplus part of the produce 
of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce 
of other men’s labour as he has occasion for [I.iii.1, p. 31]. 
Say illustrates the same idea in “Des Débouchés” [1803, I.i.22, pp. 153-154]: 
Imagine a very industrious individual having everything he needs to produce things: both ability 
and capital; if he were the only industrious person in a population which, aside from a few 
coarse foods, does not know how to make anything; what could he do with his products? He 
will purchase the quantity of rough food necessary to satisfy his needs. But what can he do with 
the residue? Nothing. 
Thus, Say concludes, the existence of a variety of useful goods or products is a neces-
sary prerequisite for exchange to take place: “if the outputs of the country begin to mul-
tiply and grow more varied, then all of his produce can find a use, that is to say, it can 
                                                           
41 Probably Mill’s review influenced Say when the latter revised “Des Débouchés” for the second edition 
and expanded it from 3 to 16 pages. Niehans [1990, p. 111] states that it is unknown, however, whether 
Say has also been influenced by Mill’s Commerce Defended [1807]. 
42 See Clower [2003, p. 3]. 
43 Groenewegen  [1987] differentiates between two kinds of the division of labor: „The division of labour 
may be defined as the division of a process or employment into parts, each of which is carried out by a 
separate person. This includes the separation of employments or professions within society at large or 
social division of labour as well as the division of labour which takes place within the walls of a factory 
building or within the limits of a single industry, the manufacturing division of labour” [p. 901]. Of 
course, Adam Smith was concerned with the social division of labor. J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 9 – 
be exchanged for things which he needs or for additional luxuries he can enjoy, or for 
the accumulation of the stocks that he considers appropriate” [I.1.22, p. 154].
44 
Similarly, economic thinkers recognized, long before Say, a further idea contained in 
“Des Débouchés,” namely that money serves “only” a facilitating function in the con-
duct of exchange [Gide and Rist, 1913, p. 129]. About half a century before Say, 
Smith’s friend and teacher, David Hume, stated that “[m]oney is not, properly speaking, 
one of the subjects of commerce; but only the instrument which men have agreed upon 
to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. It is none of the wheels of 
trade: It is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more smooth and easy” 
[(1752) 1955, p. 33]. Likewise, Smith observes that “[m]oney [is] the great wheel of 
circulation, the great instrument of commerce” [II.ii.23, p. 291] and “[t]he sole use of 
money is to circulate consumable goods” [II.iii.23, p. 339]. 
In “Des Débouchés,” Say argues: ”[M]oney serves approximately the same role as the 
posters and the handbills in a large city which facilitate the intercourse of persons who 
may want to do business with one another” [1803, I.i.22, p. 152]. Despite alluding to the 
information-producing function of monetary exchange, Say concludes that, ultimately, 
“[m]oney performs no more than the role of a conduit in this double exchange” [pp. 
153-154].
45 
From the general interdependence of economic actors and the intermediate role of 
money follows what is generally regarded as the gist of the law of markets, that is, 
“[w]hen the exchanges have been completed, it will be found that one has paid for 
products with products“ [italics mine; Say, 1803, I.i.22, p. 154].
46 Analogously, Smith 
states that “every man may purchase [with his product] whatever part of the produce of 
other men’s talents he has occasion for” [(1776) 1979, I.ii.5, p. 30].  
According to Sowell [1972, p. 12], the law of markets “produced two of the most 
sweeping, bitter, and long-lasting controversies in the history of economics.“
47 A less 
controversial interpretation of Say’s conclusion in “Des Débouchés” is possible, how-
ever, when reserving the term „purchase“ to transactions where an „exchange is made 
involving one commodity called ‚money’” [Say, 1807, II.1, p. 355]. Giving credit to 
                                                           
44 Lavington [1925, p. 24] likewise observes the general interdependence of economic actors: “In a time 
of general depression the individual firm is working at low pressure because other firms are working at 
low pressure. […] The inactivity of all is the cause of the inactivity of each.”  
45 In the light of Hume’s and Smith’s statements, it seems unnecessary to underline Say’s “emphasis [on] 
[...] the unimportance of money” [Baumol, 1977, p. 153]. 
46 Say concludes that “when a nation has too large a quantity of one particular type of product, the means 
of disposing of them is to create goods of another variety” [1803, I.i.22, p. 154]. According to Stigler 
1953, p. 312], this sentence of “Des Débouchés” contains the gist of the law of markets.  
47 Sowell refers to the early nineteenth century and to the Keynesian revolution of the 1930s. J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 10 – 
Say’s emphasis on the intermediate role of money, one might substitute the term „pur-
chased“ for the phrase „given in exchange.”
48 In accord with the French historians 
Charles Gide and Charles Rist [1910, pp.129-131],
49 the law of markets can now be 
stated as follows: “[P]roducts are given in exchange for products” [pp. 128-129]. 
Gide and Rist remark that “though [Say’s expression] is a happy phrase, it is not in truth 
very profound.” Referring to the high hopes that Say attached to the diffusion of his 
“discovery,” they characterize Say’s notion as “so vague and so self-evident as being 
almost useless” [p. 129]. Agreeing with Gide and Rist, Clower [2003, p. 4] justly re-
gards Say’s proposition, “products are given in exchange for products,” as a mere 
“Platitude.” Nevertheless and in contrast to any theorems associated with Say’s Law, 
Say’s Platitude is neither contentious nor quantitative [Clower, 2003, p. 4; Gide and 
Rist, 1913, p. 129].
50 
Despite Say’s statements in “Des Débouchés,” he does not consider trade-facilitating 
institutions (e.g., money and markets) to be unimportant. In fact, he stresses the impor-
tance of both of these institutions for the organization of the exchange process. As for 
money, he does so less in “Des Débouchés” than in the first chapter of book ii entitled 
“Of the Nature and Uses of Money.”
51 The first part of this chapter, which stresses the 
want for exchange, represents an almost literal copy of the first part of “Des Débou-
chés.” Therefore, the content of the chapter “Of the Nature and Uses of Money” is in-
dicative of Say’s view on the subject in general, including “Des Débouchés”. Say con-
tinues that trade-facilitating institutions “are indispensable in an advanced stage of civi-
lization“ and that „[i]n a very advanced state of civilization […] exchange becomes a 
matter of more urgent necessity, as well as much more frequent and more complicated 
[...].” In summary, “[m]oney is the more requisite, the more civilized a nation is, and the 
further it has carried the division of labor” [1807, II.ii.1, pp. 350-356].
52 
                                                           
48 See Gide and Rist [(1915) 2000, p. 115]. 
49 According to Gide and Rist, the only interesting aspect of the “law of markets” lies in its application to 
overproduction (“general glut”) theories. 
50 Hobson [(1894) 1965, p. 289] remarks that „since all commerce is ultimately resolvable into exchange 
of commodities for commodities, it is obvious that every increase of production signifies a corresponding 
increase in the power to consume. […] But the fallacy involved in the supposition that over-supply is 
impossible consists in assuming that the power to consume and the desire to consume necessarily co-exist 
in the same persons. […] In order to be operative in the steady maintenance of industry the desire to con-
sume must be a desire to consume now, to consume continuously, and to consume to an extent corre-
sponding with the power to consume.” 
51 The title of book ii [1803] is “De la Monnaye” (“On Money”). From the second edition on, Say made 
this chapter 21 of book i, leaving its title unchanged. 
52 See Say [(1834) 1964, pp. 217-219]. Say does not discuss the underlying forces that might make the 
use of exchange facilitating institutions more necessary. He recognized, however, that barter exchanges 
become more inconvenient the more subdivided the tasks performed. Arrow [1980, pp. 160-162] argues 
that an increased division of labor also increases the costs of coordination due do a more extensive need 
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Conclusion 
The passages quoted from the Traité reveal that, although the division of labor was less 
elaborate at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
53 Say was impressed by the com-
plexity of exchange relations.
54 As far as concerns the analysis of the coordination of 
economic activity, Say’s Traité [1803] still offers many lessons to be learned. First, in 
contrast to Smith and modern equilibrium theorists, Say clearly appreciates and empha-
sizes the importance of trade specialists and money for the economic well-being of so-
ciety.
55 He considers trade-facilitating services as resource-consuming, productive ac-
tivities indistinguishable from those performed by most other industries. Second, replac-
ing Smith’s “invisible hand” with a description of the nature and use of trade specialists, 
Say deserves credit for introducing into economic literature what Clower called the 
“visible fingers“ of the invisible hand. As indicated above, Say’s conception of a market 
economy allows one to ascertain the subtleties of some of Smith’s central doctrines. 
Replaced throughout later editions by issues pertinent to the overproduction crisis, chap-
ter 22 of the first edition contains an unambiguous proposition concerning the interde-
pendence of transactors in an exchange economy. Therefore, Say’s first edition of the 
Traité deserves more scholarly attention than it has so far received as a basis for inquiry 
into the coordination of economic activities. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
for communication. Alchian [1977] analyzes the role of money in reducing information and transaction 
costs. 
53 Commenting on the striking phenomena of the economic system more than a century and a half after 
Say, Knight [1967, p. 31] observes that “[w]e have an amazingly elaborate division of labour,“ which 
implies a social order of “unfathomable complexity.“ 
54 On the complexity of (unintended) market-coordination, Smith remarks in the Wealth of Nations: „Ob-
serve the accommodation of the most common artificer or day-labourer in a civilized and thriving coun-
try, and you will perceive that the number of people of whose industry a part though but a small part, has 
been employed in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation. [...] How much com-
merce and navigation in particular, how many ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-makers, must have 
been employed in order to bring together the different drugs made use of by the dyer, which often come 
from the remotest corners of the world! [...] [I]f we examine, I say, all these things, and consider what a 
variety of labour is employed about each of them, we shall be sensible that without the assistance and co-
operation of many thousands, the very meanest person in a civilized country could not be provided, even 
according to, what we very falsely imagine, the easy and simple manner in which he is commonly ac-
commodated” [italics mine; (1776) 1979, I.i.11, pp. 22-23]. 
55 Modern research demonstrated that both institutions can be explained as arising from the same behav-
ioral forces (see Howitt and Clower [2000]). J.-B. SAY’S 1803 TREATISE AND THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY  – 12 – 
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